The paper argues that the institutional framework put in place by the Kenyan government for poverty reduction in the period [2005][2006][2007] 
Introduction
This paper argues that the institutional framework for urban planning for poverty reduction in the period 2005-2007 was inimical to participation, and thus not effective for poverty reduction. The absence of sanction is the weakest element in the institutional framework. With the exception of the Environment Management and Coordination Act (EMCA), answerability is also limited in these frameworks. While the institutional responses to poverty are diverse and growing, the analysis shows that these are generally notional. The stakeholder involvement is extensively applied as a tool for citizen participation. This stakeholder model has limitations, -built-in exclusions, so that overall the frameworks are by design not aimed at delivering full accountability to citizens.
The rest of this paper is organised in five parts. The next section examines the institutional framework at a national level and is followed by a discussion of the frameworks at the City of Nairobi level. The effectiveness of national institutional measures for poverty reduction such as the National Poverty Plan (1999) is presented in the fourth section. The paper then turns to the institutional framework of implementing the Local Authorities Service Delivery Action Plans (LASDAP) in Viwandani, and closes with a conclusion in the last section.
The National Level Framework
There are different legal and planning instruments that guide planning in Kenya. At the national level, planning is a hybrid of both cooperative (between government ministries or departments) and hierarchical systems. Most of the government departments have a planning responsibility set out in the legal instruments establishing the central government ministries. Whilst there are central government departments, much of the planning mandate is carried out at the local level in the districts through the District Development Plans. The Office of the President, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Finance are 'super' departments in an otherwise cooperative planning system as they operate elaborate network of branches throughout the country.
There are several central government departments with clearly defined mandates for development: the Office of the President (OP), particularly the Provincial Administration, represents an unusual control of planning and development, and related decision-making in Kenya. The Provincial Administration has an elaborate link between the President and the citizens that typifies the relations between the state/President and citizens. The top-down relation between the citizen and the OP and the hierarchical nature of these relations are important features of this framework. This meticulous system of Provincial Administration has a two-fold mandate: implementing central government policies and decisions at the lowest level and to ensure internal security of the country (Akatch, 1992) .
In many respects, the OP, through a detailed Provincial Administration system whose network stretches from the location in the villages to the Minister in the Office of the President, determines much of the planning direction in the country. Literature (for example Odhiambo-Mbai, 1996; Wanyande, 1996; 2005) shows that the Provincial Administration system has its origins in the Colonial government and provides an efficient system for ensuring law and order; but have also made law and order the raison d'être of planning, and allocation of land in the informal settlements. Other central government departments represented at the District level are not only responsible and accountable to the District Commissioner(s) but also to Officers of the Provincial Administration. Several legal frameworks provide the mandate for these departments to provide basic services critical in urban planning. Table 1 outlines these in some detail. • Ensure human settlements are well planned by providing an appropriate spatial framework within which environmental and socio-economic development activities can harmoniously take place.
• Prepare national, regional physical development plans and policies (strategic, structure and zoning plans)
• The Physical Planning Act 1996 • The National Land Policy
Ministry of Regional Development
• Planning economically on how to utilise the following regional developments: Coast Development Authority (CDA); Ewaso Ng'iro North Development Authority (ENNDA); Ewaso Ng'iro South Development Authority (ENSDA); Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA); Kerio Valley Development Authority (KVDA); Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority (TARDA)
• Although there are several institutions that have been established to address various aspects of urban planning; the great number of these institutions is the main weakness. A close scrutiny of the institutions at the national level shows that these are fragmented and makes urban planning impossible. Moreover, the power and influence of the OP and ministries of finance and local government mean that citizens do not have any influence on how decisions affecting them are made or even where resources are expended.
The City of Nairobi Level
The institutional framework for poverty reduction at the City of Nairobi level is unwieldy and rather complicated. In terms of politics, the city of Nairobi comprises eight constituencies and 56 wards (a constituency is a geopolitical area that is represented in parliament by an elected representative, i.e., a Member of Parliament (MP), whilst a ward is a geopolitical area represented in the City Council by an elected representative known as a Councillor) as shown in Table 2 . At present, Nairobi is also one of the eight provinces in Kenya, namely: Central, Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley, North Eastern, Nyanza, Western and Nairobi provinces. However, with the promulgation of the current Constitution, Nairobi now also becomes one of the forty-seven counties in Kenya's new devolved structure of government. But Nairobi is also the capital of Kenya and the headquarters of two United Nations agencies -the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). Source: Nairobi City Council (2002) The Ministry of Local Government through its Urban Development department is mandated to coordinate urban development, including poverty reduction, by facilitating effective strategic development and sustainable delivery of infrastructure and social services by local authorities The Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development is also mandated to ensure integrated Nairobi Metropolitan Areas Growth and Development Strategy through its Vision 2030. The ministry also aims at improving governance via the system of creating an environment of certainty for private investment. Although measures are put in place to ensure that the institutional framework promotes active collaboration between different parties, including neighbouring areas, government spheres, private sector, and other stakeholders, the effect has been a complicated maze. Table 3 below identifies other actors, particularly at national level, in the framework at the City level. As mentioned earlier, the City of Nairobi is also the capital of Kenya. Because of its political and economic significance, important political institutions of local/city, national and international scope are operational in Nairobi. This further complicates the institutional framework for poverty reduction. Of course there is the City Council of Nairobi that is mandated to develop and manage the city. However, operationally, there are significant complications when the institutional framework for poverty reduction is unravelled. Figure 1 shows the complex framework within which the City of Nairobi operates and responds to poverty. Although prepared 14 years ago, there have not been changes to the governance structure of Nairobi; such changes will only take effect after commencement of the County Government Act (2013).
Figure 1. Governance Structure for Nairobi
Source: Aligula (1999: 91 In a nutshell, apart from the interface between national frameworks and city level frameworks, the City of Nairobi also has an elaborate institutional framework. There are 16 departments in the City Council of Nairobi (CCN). Of these, the City Planning Department, the Environment Department, the City Engineering Department, the Housing Department, Education, the Social Services and Housing Department, and the Public Health Department are critical in poverty reduction. According to the Local Government Act (Cap. 265 of the laws of Kenya), a local authority such as the City of Nairobi is responsible for provision and management of services within its jurisdiction.
The City Nairobi is faced by numerous challenges such as poor economic conditions, rapid population growth, and strict control by the Ministry of Local Government, political interference and poor management services. As a result, not only are the living conditions of the population deteriorating further but economic production is also being constrained. Lack of municipal services leaves the poor with no alternative except to buy water and electricity from private sources, ultimately leaving them to pay far more than the rich do for these services.
As Figure 2 shows, from a political perspective, the highest unit of governance in the City of Nairobi is the Mayor. The Mayor, although a councillor, is elected by other councillors. Therefore, the Mayor also continues as councillor for a specific ward. Except for nominated councillors, all the others are elected via a general election. Although voters registered in various wards of City of Nairobi elect councillors, councillors elect the mayor, deputy mayor and chairmen of departments during special elections of the City Council of Nairobi. However, the Minister of local Government appoints the Town Clerk, the substantive chief executive of the City of Nairobi. The Town Clerk is a civil servant and essentially the most powerful individual in the city. There is an overlap of frameworks on the one hand and the institutions that were created under those frameworks on the other hand, all of which are relevant for citizen participation in urban planning for poverty reduction. For example, there is an overlap of institutions created under the system of local government, institutions created under the structure of provincial administration, notably chiefs and assistant chiefs, and institutions created with the constituency (the electoral district) as the unit of reference. Nonetheless, even when Local Authorities (LA) are theoretically autonomous, the existence of an ubiquitous parallel structure of government in the Office of the President (OP)/Provincial Administration confirms the "super-ministry" label of the OP, and lends credence to the view that LAs' interventions are invariably sanctioned by the OP.
After the departure of President Moi in 2002, the incoming parliament argued strongly for increased control of development spending by members of parliament at constituency level, resulting in a proliferation of funds managed at constituency level and multiple structures managing these funds. This trend of directing development funding through MPs has done a lot to further weaken local governments (civic authorities) as relevant units of local planning. Before 2002 the role of local government was eclipsed by that of the provincial administration due to the dominance of the presidency, which meant by-passing local government and relying instead on the provincial administration structure under the Office of the President as the main channel for state interaction with citizens at the local level. 7 The Kenya Local Government Reform Programme (KLGRP), set up in 1996, has been working toward implementing reforms that restore the relevance and credibility of the local government system.
Assessing Interventions for Poverty Reduction
The 1999 National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) and the PRSPs prepared with significant involvement of non-state actors like NGOs are key features of the attention poverty received in the 1990s. Moreover, the first poverty maps based on the 1999 National Population and Housing Census, showing the incidence of poverty, were collaboratively prepared by the government, the World Bank, the Society for International Development and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003) . This also triggered a sequence of equally influential studies on poverty and inequality in Kenya.
The most notable of these studies was the Kenya Human Development Report of 2001 (UNDP, 2001) and the Society for International Development's Pulling Apart SID, 2004) study on poverty and inequality. With such unprecedented attention to poverty at the national level, inequality and to some extent poverty reduction, momentum gathered to dominate the national political, perhaps even academic discourses and debates. With these developments, then, it would no doubt be agreed that poverty reduction was finally 'mainstreamed' in the national plans of Kenya.
The National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) 1999 -2015
While the powerful succeeded for at least 40 years in creating and sustaining an all-powerful imperial presidency, it may also be justifiable to argue that through power, the less powerful endured and after 40 years succeeded in pulling the imperial presidency apart. Although various forms of power impacted the institutional framework, three are conspicuous: power in things, power through mobilisation, and power as immanent (Cahill, 2008) . But the birth of the second republic also ensured the re-birth of institutions that significantly reconfigured the institutional framework for poverty reduction.
The National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) not only attempted to understand the poverty problem but it also outlined suggestions for its eradication. Right from President Moi's foreword to the plan, it was clear that the government acknowledged the problem of poverty ravaging the people of Kenya.
The National Poverty Eradication Plan presents a framework on how we are going to tackle poverty that afflicts a large percentage of our people. My Government has been committed to poverty reduction as a key ingredient to building an economically strong and prosperous nation, with a cohesive society in which all have an opportunity to realise their full potential. It is out of this strong commitment that we have been able to make significant progress in the social sectors notably in education and health despite some recent slight setbacks arising from the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (Moi, 1999) .
The NPEP was also significant as a trailblazer for national planning that was specifically targeted at poverty eradication. In a significant departure from national development planning circumspection, the Plan admitted that poverty was a national crisis:
Poverty reduction is a national challenge. Initially, Kenya hoped to eradicate it through economic growth. It was seen as a short-term hardship which would disappear as the nation developed and grew in economic terms. Poverty is now recognised as a major threat to a very significant section of Kenyan households; worrying follow-on consequences for the security and economic well-being of those with surplus income and good services. It is also increasingly recognised that economic growth alone will not be sufficient to reduce poverty (Republic of Kenya, 1999: 2) .
In terms of national planning, the NPEP was also innovative in several ways. First, it attempted a reflective evaluation of past interventions for development (ibid.: 4-11). The evaluation provided a sound basis for shifting intervention beyond simple economic growth objectives. Second, the government in this plan made another important admission: that National plans did not provide room to focus exclusively on poverty (ibid.: 5). In this plan the government also acknowledged the importance of civil society in any poverty reduction interventions. Hitherto, the private sector and the state were the only recognised actors in development and, to some extent, in poverty reduction. Third, even when the government emphasised the need for economic growth, it also made another critical observation:
While economic efficiency arguments may have dictated these actions, the benefits were not equitably shared. The introduction of cost-sharing and cost recovery arrangements in basic social services has worked against a great majority of poor groups. The quality of the services deteriorated and the resources were extremely limited (ibid.: 27).
The above observation not only highlighted the policy effects of interventions that were based on the notion of absolute poverty. Economic efficiency was the dominant perspective, even perceived as a panacea for poverty reduction. Despite its negative effects and limitations, economic growth was nonetheless the path recommended. This suggests that it was a case of the lesser evil and there must be growth in the economy to be shared amongst the rich and the poor. In identifying the poor, the plan also made a distinction between rural and urban poverty, noting: "the incidence of poverty in Kenya was 47 per cent in the rural areas and 29 per cent in the urban areas" (ibid.).
The main objective of the plan, however, was: "to achieve pro-poor growth and service delivery" (Republic of Kenya, 1999: xi) . Box 1 shows the specific goals and targets of this plan. For the first time, the government also introduced hitherto unorthodox terms in planning. The plan included the Charter for Social Integration (CSI), produced by civil society, including social movements, outlining a range of basic rights that the government expressed a commitment to ensure all citizens enjoyed. These rights included literacy and numeracy, health, adequate food and clean water to maintain life, well-being and enthusiasm, and education (ibid.: 32). Evidently, the NPEP was comprehensive in its analysis of poverty and the strategies it proposed for its reduction. Unlike the other plans it was perceived as the interface between the National Development Plans and the needs of the poor. The CSI, the deliberate commitment to improve basic services to the poor and a pro-poor economic growth strategy underscored the NPEP's relevance and breadth in terms of poverty reduction.
The NPEP was to be implemented in three 5-year phases: 1999-2004; 2005-2010; and 2011-2015 . Doubtless, the NPEP held much promise in the fight against poverty. In 2000, the Commission for Poverty Eradication (CPE) was established in the Office of the President. This was to be assisted by another body, the Poverty Eradication Unit (PEU). The CPE was expected to revive the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) approach and network. Community participation was a catch-phrase in government-speak during this time.
Various funds, commonly known as decentralised/devolved funds, were established by the central government to improve interventions for poverty reduction. Table 4 presents a detailed analysis of the devolved funds in Kenya. These funds were an evident attempt to decentralise public expenditure and address poverty. Together, all the interventions mentioned above formed the broad institutional framework for planning for poverty reduction. Beyond providing analysis of the numerous funds availed by the state for poverty reduction, Table 4 also shows the broad institutional response to poverty. However, the effectiveness of the above responses in reducing poverty is not known. For instance, as Table 5 shows, the Poverty Eradication Fund had received a paltry 161 million shillings since its inception. From the funds that the government allocated to the Poverty Eradication Fund, the government was evidently reluctant to engage with and/or promote planning for poverty reduction. Source: National Council of Churches of Kenya (2005: 41) The ways in which the presidency was created and how it exercised extra-constitutional powers to stifle the independence of other institutions of government demonstrate the fact that power "…is not found in the resources, but in the use of those resources" (ibid.). Until 2010, the presidency was the most powerful institution in Kenya. As shown above, the power of the presidency was vested both in the resources it controlled and the manner in which these resources were deployed. In the use of these resources as Ghai and Ghai (undated:8) show, "…corruption drained away billions of shillings which belonged to the state…" resulting in more poverty. Thus, the use of this power shows the creation of relative powerfulness of the presidency and the relative powerlessness of the poor.
The Institutional Framework for Implementing the LASDAP
The range of actors and their relationships to one another shows the complexity of the institutional framework within which the LASDAP was implemented. These actors include the citizens, officials of the City of Nairobi, and officials of the central government, particularly those from the Ministry of Local Government (MLG), professionals; others are drawn from the private sector and various civil society organisations. Although implemented at the city and sub-city levels, the rules for implementing the LASDAP were largely established by the Minstry of Local Government and central government in general. Figure 3 shows how the MLG envisioned the LASDAP. Table 6 gives one dimension of these relations. My discussions with various actors show that with the exception of the consultation phase that had a token presence of citizens and civil society organisations, the City of Nairobi has dominated and virtually excluded the citizens in the rest of the phases. The City was able to dominate the LASDAP through a combination of condign and compensatory power (Galbriath, 1983) . Hence, as Putnam (1993) would argue, the above is an illustrative case of how institutions shape the behaviour of actors. Since the City retained all decision-making power, and the poor and other citizens relied upon invitations to participate, it is understandable that actors in the City were invariably inclined to exclude citizens whilst tinkering at the edges of the status quo. For instance, from the accounts I received during the field studies the LASDAP Technical Committee was essentially comprised of chief officers (or heads of department of the City of Nairobi). From the analysis of the key actors who were involved in the LASDAP at each stage as shown in Table 6 above, it was unlikely that with a dominant City that crowded out citizens, the same supported participation and accountability. Even though the City seemed to dominate, it was indeed a few actors such as the Town Clerk, heads of departments and powerful politicians who dominated these relations and the institutional framework at the city and sub-city level. Figure 4 above shows the details of the organisational structure, which was supposed to guide the planning and implementation of the LASDAP. From the organisational structure presented in Figure 4 , it is apparent that the City had a hierarchical top-down structure to plan and implement the LASDAP. But, again, it was not always clear whether the structure guided implementation and the City significantly complied with the same.
Conclusions
The analysis of the institutional framework for urban planning for poverty reduction in this paper yields a mixed picture. The last 90 years of resistance against oppression by the government and struggle for change demonstrate the usefulness of power through mobilisation in changing unequal power relations and empowering previously powerless citizens. Regarding the ways in which the institutional framework affects citizen participation, it is clear that the stakeholder involvement is extensively applied as a tool for citizen participation. This stakeholder model has limitations; its in-built exclusions have been discussed. Secondly, concerning the mechanisms for accountability it is fair to say that overall the frameworks are by design not aimed at delivering full accountability to citizens. The absence of sanction is the weakest element in the institutional framework. With the exception of the EMCA, answerability is also limited in these frameworks. While the institutional responses to poverty are diverse and growing, the analysis shows that these are generally notional. Finally, regarding the way power impacts participation and accountability in the institutional frameworks, the analysis shows the institutional framework for urban planning for poverty reduction is not supportive of citizen participation and does not enhance accountability.
